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A class of computable functions is maximal iff it can be incrementally
learned by some inductive inference machine (IIM), but no infinitely
larger class of computable functions can be so learned. Rolf Wiehagen
posed the question whether there exist such maximal classes. This
question and many interesting variants are answered herein in the
negative. Viewed positively, each IIM can be infinitely improved upon!
Also discussed are the problems of algorithmically finding the
improvements proved to exist. ] 1999 Academic Press
1. INTRODUCTION
Let PR denote the class of primitive recursive functions.1
There is a machine MPR which, when fed successively more
values of any f # PR, after finitely many trial and error out-
put programs, eventually settles on an output program
which computes f [16, 3]. We say MPR incrementally learns
(or Ex-identifies) f [10]. PR is a large and inclusive class of
computable functions [11]. It is interesting, then, to ask
whether there are classes of computable functions strictly
larger than PR which are also incrementally learnable (i.e.,
Ex-identifiable).
Let Ex denote the class of all classes of computable func-
tions each Ex-identifiable by some machine. Then, for
example, PR # Ex. It is well known and easy to show that,
if S # Ex and SS$, where (S$&S) is finite, then
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S$ # Ex too.2 Hence, if we add any finite collection of com-
putable functions to PR we still get a class in Ex. This
discussion suggests the following.
Definition 1. A class of computable functions S is
Ex-maximal def both S # Ex and there is no S$ # Ex such
that SS$ and (S$&S) is infinite.
A variant of the question of the first paragraph in this sec-
tion is whether PR is Ex-maximal. It trivially is not. For
example, using the enumeration technique [3, 15, 16] one
can show that each level of the Pe ter-hierarchy [22, 27] is
in Ex.3
Wiehagen [30] asked whether there is an Ex-maximal
class. In Section 3 below we answer the question and inter-
esting variants each negatively.4 A positive, informal restate-
ment is Infinite improvement is always possible!
In Section 4 below we discuss the problems of algo-
rithmically finding the improvements proved to exist.
2. PRELIMINARIES
The definitions, notations, and facts given here all from
[10, 16, 26].
N is the set of natural numbers [0, 1, 2, ...]; i, n, m, x, y,
and z, as well as subscripted and superscripted versions of
2 This case be proved by iteration of the following. Suppose M Ex-iden-
tifies S. Suppose f is computable. Then M$ Ex-identifies (S _ [ f ]), where
M$ on g(0), g(1), ..., g(n) outputs a fixed program for f unless it discovers
some kn such that g(k){ f (k); in this case it outputs like M would on
g(0), g(1), ..., g(n).
3 Of course each level of this hierarchy above the primitive recursive
functions is infinitely larger than the previous level.
4 Wiehagen’s question, with some of its variants, was third in the list
problems in [4]. Our solutions were announced in [7]. Firevalds and
Kinber announced a later, independent solution, which was restricted to
Wiehagen’s original question [12]. The present paper is the first publi-
cation of our proofs outside of the second author’s dissertation [13] done
under the supervision of the first author.1 0022-000099 30.00
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these letters, range over N. The asterisk * is used as a sym-
bol in various locations that might otherwise be occupied by
a number; a ranges over N _ [V].
. is an arbitrary acceptable numbering of the partial
computable functions [17, 23, 24, 25, 28]. Hence, .p is
the partial computable function: N  N computed by
.-program p. Lower case Greek letters other than . range
over partial computable functions. R is the set of com-
putable functions; f and g range over R.
The domain of a partial computable function  is denoted
by $. We write (x) a if x # , that is, if (x) is defined. We
write 1(x)=2(x) iff either both 1 and 2 are undefined
on x or both are defined and equal on x. We write 1 =
n 2
iff [x # N : 1(x){2(x)] has at most n elements; in this
case, we call 2 an n-variant of 1 . We write 1 *= 2 iff
[x # N : 1(x){2(x)] is finite; in that case, we call 2 a
finite variant of 1 . If P is a predicate on N, we write
(\

x) P(x) iff the set of numbers that do not satisfy P is
finite.
The variables _, _0 , and _1 range over finite sequences of
numbers; consistently with the use of lower-case Greek
letters given above, finite sequences are considered to be
functions from initial segments of N to N. We write _0 _1
and _0 / f iff, respectively, _0 is an initial subsequence of _1
and _0 is an initial subsequence of f (0), f (1), ... .
An inductive inference (or learning) machine (IIM) is an
algorithmic device which takes, as input, a sequence of
values f (0), f (1), ... from some computable function f, and
which, from time to time, as it is receiving its input, outputs
a computer program [10, 26].
The variables M, M0 , and M$ range over inductive
inference machines. Following [10], we assume that the
output of an IIM is well defined after any sequence of inputs
(including the empty sequence); [3, 10] demonstrate that
our assumptions about IIMs entail no loss of generality.
We write M( f ) a iff (_x)(\

_/ f )[M(_)=x]. That is,
M( f ) a iff, as M is receiving its input, it eventually outputs
some program x and thereafter never outputs any other
program. If M( f ) a , we write M( f ) for that final program.
We say that M Exa-identifies f [10, 16] iff both M( f ) a
and .M( f ) =
a f. That is, M as it is receiving successive values
of f as input, eventually outputs a program for an
a-variant of f (finite variant if a= V ) and thereafter never
outputs a different program.
We say that M Bca-identifies f [2, 10] iff (\

_/ f )
[.M(_) =
a f ]. That is, if M is fed the values of f, then, after
M has received some suitable amount of input, thereafter
each of the outputs of M is a program for an
a-variant of f.
For a given IIM M, Exa(M) is the class of functions that
M Exa-identifies. Similarly, Bca(M) is the class of func-
212 CASE ANtions that M Bca-identifies. Exa=[SR : (_M)[S
Exa(M)]]. Bca=[SR : (_M)[SBca(M)]]. Note that
Exa is a class of classes of computable functions, as is Bca.3. RESULTS
The following definition generalizes Ex-maximality from
Definition 1 in Section 1 above.
Definition 2. Suppose I is a class of classes of com-
putable functions (e.g., I could be Exa or Bca). A class of
computable functions S is I-maximal def both S # I and
there is no S$ # I such that SS$ and (S$&S) is infinite.
Theorem 1. For each a # N _ [V], there is no
Exa-maximal class.
Proof. Assume we are given a set S # Exa. Let M be an
IIM such that SExa(M). We are done if we can con-
struct an IIM M$ such that Exa(M)Exa(M$) and
(Exa(M$)&Exa(M)) is infinite. The crucial trick is to
consider the following two cases.5 :
Case (1). For each finite sequence _, there is an
f # Exa(M) that extends _ (i.e., which is such that _/ f ).
By Kleene’s S-m-n theorem [26], there is a computable
function g such that, for each i, .-program g(i) runs the
following computation in stages and .g(i) is the union of
[{0 , {1 , . . .] from the stages.
Stage 0. {0={$0=(0, i) , y0=0.
Stage n+1. g(i) searches for {$n+1 and yn+1 such
that {n {$n+1 , yn+1  ${$n+1 , and .M({$n+1)( yn+1) a . g(i)
then sets {n+1 to be such that {$n+1 {n+1 ; {n+1( yn+1)=
1+.M({$n+1)( yn+1), and {n+1(x)=0 for all x< yn+1 such
that x  ${$n+1 .
[.g(i) : i # N] is easily seen to be an infinite set of partial
computable functions from the fact that, for each i,
.g(i)(0) a =i.
To finish Case (1), we proceed with a series of claims.
Claim 1. For each i, .g(i) is total.
Proof of Claim 1. We begin by proving that every stage
in the construction of .g(i) halts. That Stage 0 halts is
obvious.
Consider Stage n+1, for an arbitrary n. Since we are in
Case (1), there is some f such that {n  f and f # Exa(M).
From the definition of Exa, for all sufficiently long _f,
.M(_)=
a f. Choose such a _ such that {n _. All sufficiently
large z satisfy .M(_)(z) a = f (z); choose such a z large
enough that z  $_. The chosen _ and z satisfy the
requirements on {$n+1 and yn+1 in Stage n+1; therefore the
search in Stage n+1 halts, and we have shown that every
stage halts.
It is easily seen that, for each n, ({n+1&{n) is not empty.
D FULKImmediately we have Claim 1. K
5 We will have more to say about the dichotomy provided by these cases
in Section 4 below.
LClaim 2. For each i, .q(i)  Exa(M).
Proof of Claim 2. Suppose by way of contradiction
otherwise. Then M(.g(i)) a . Note that y0< y1< } } } . For
all m, .g(i)( ym)=1+.M({$m)( ym){.M({$m)( ym). For all
sufficiently large m, M({$m)=M(.g(i)). Therefore, for all
sufficiently large m, .M(.g(i))( ym){.g(i)( ym). K
Claim 3. (Exa(M) _ [.g(i) : i # N]) # Exa.
Proof of Claim 3. Let M$ be an IIM such that
M$(_)={g(_(0)),M(_),
if _.g(_(0)) ,
otherwise.
Suppose f # Exa(M). Then f{.g(_(0)) , and for all suf-
ficiently large _f, _3 .g(_(0)) and M$(_)=M(_). Then
M$( f ) a =M( f ) and f # Exa(M$).
Suppose i given. For all _.g(i) , M$(_)= g(i), so
M$(.g(i)) a = g(i) and therefore .g(i) # Ex0(M$)
Exa(M$). K
Claims 1, 2, and 3 prove Theorem 1 in Case (1).
Case (2). Not Case (1); that is, there is a _0 such that
(\ f | _0  f )[ f  Exa(M)].
Let S0 be some easily identifiable infinite set of total
extensions of _0 ; for example, the set of functions of finite
support [3] containing _0 . Let M0 be an IIM that
Exa-identifies S0 .
Let M$ be such that
M$(_)={M0(_),M(_),
if _0 _,
otherwise.
We will prove that (Exa(M) _ S0)Exa(M$).
Suppose f # Exa(M). Then, for all _f, _0 3 _, and
M$(_)=M(_). Therefore, M$( f )a =M( f ), and f#Exa(M$).
Suppose f # S0 . Then, for all sufficiently large _f,
_0 _ and M$(_)=M0(_). Since f # Exa(M0), it follows
that M$( f ) a =M0( f ) and f # Exa(M$). K
Theorem 2. For each m # N, there is no Bcm-maximal
class.
Proof. This proof is identical to the proof of Theorem 1
above, except for the following modifications in Case (1). In
Stage n+1, g(i) searches for {$n+1 and y0n+1 , y
1
n+1 , ..., y
m
n+1
such that, for each im, .M({$n+1)( y
i
n+1) a . For each im,
set {n+1( y in+1)=1+.M({$n+1)( y
i
n+1). Thus, infinitely many
of the output programs of M are made wrong on m+1
inputs, when M is fed .g(i) . K
By Harrington’s surprising result in [10], R # Bc*.
Hence, since R cannot even be finitely improved upon, R is
a Bc*-maximal class.
MAXIMAL MACHINEIt is easy to modify the proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 to
apply to identifiable classes of 0, 1-valued functions. The
first change is to have the sequence of values of .g(i) beginwith i 0’s followed by a 1. The second change is to substitute
proper subtraction for addition in the definition of {n+1 in
Stage n+1 of the constructions in Case (1) of each proof.
We thus see that, if we restrict Exa and Bcm to 0, 1-valued
computable functions, there are still no Exa-maximal or
Bcm-maximal classes.
References [3, 8, 10, 14, 19] contain definitions of
restricted classes of inductive inference machines called
Popperian, postdictively complete, postdictively consistent,
and reliable (or strong). It is easy to see that the machines
M$ constructed in the proof of Theorem 1 have any of these
properties that apply to the input machines M.
4. RELATED WORK AND FURTHER PROBLEMS
Another model of machine learning, called formal
language learning, involves sequential presentation of the
elements of a recursively enumerable language L (positive
data about or text for L) to an IIM which must, after finitely
many trial and error rounds, eventually output a grammar
(or grammars) for L. See [6, 9, 16, 20, 21] for definitions
and basic results. The language learning analogs of Exa and
Bca are called TxtExa and TxtBca, respectively. Sur-
prisingly, while the class F of all finite languages is in
TxtEx0, if L is any finite r.e. language, (F _ [L]) is not in
TxtBc* [6, 16, 20]. For related results see [1, 20].
From Theorems 1 and 2 in Section 3 above, we have that
any IIM M for Exa-identification or Bcm-identification can
be infinitely improved. More specifically, there is an IIM M$
which identifies infinitely many more computable functions
than M does. It is interesting to ask whether such an M$ can
be algorithmically found from M. Unfortunately, it cannot
and not even if M$ is supposed to identify only one more
computable function than does M [10]. It is further shown
in [5] that this latter kind of M$ also cannot be found from
M by an incremental algorithm which is allowed to change
its mind finitely many times about its outputs before settling
on a correct output.
The proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 above, usefully con-
sidered a dichotomy of IIMs M: those M satisfying Case (1)
and those satisfying Case (2). Reference [7] contained the
slightly overzealous claim to the effect that we had found
two algorithms for finding M$ (satisfying Theorem 1): one
for when M satisfies Case (1) and another for when M
satisfied Case (2). In fact, we had not found an algorithm for
the side of this dichotomy corresponding to Case (2). The
second author has conjectured that there is none, but this
remains open. It is also open whether there is some
dichotomy with algorithms for (infinitely) improving IIMs
on each side.
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